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Abstract: The ‘criminalisation thesis’ has proved a contentious but defining feature of
modern social and legal responses to domestic violence since the 1970s. However, crim-
inalisation has not always been the focus of legal attempts to tackle violence or offer
recourse to victims. This article uses historical examples to explore the potential of legisla-
tive intervention outside of criminal law in tackling violence against women. While the
Victorians introduced the first criminal legislation specifically developed to tackle domestic
violence, the intervention remained singular. Those addressing violence against women
soon shifted their focus towards achieving broader social and cultural change via civil
law. Legislators sought to reduce the vulnerability of women to exploitation and violence
at the hands of their husbands through reforms to child custody, divorce, and property
law. The authors find there are relevant lessons to be learned from addressing domestic
violence in this way, which might usefully inform current policy direction.
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The draft Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill 2019, at the time of writing
under parliamentary scrutiny, perpetuates a 20th/21st Century preoccu-
pation with, and embrace of, what has been termed the ‘criminalisation
thesis’. Put simply, this thesis presumes the (at least) symbolic power of
the law, when enacted through the work of criminal justice professionals,
will have a deterrent effect on those indulging in violence against women.
This thesis grew in prominence during the 1970s as feminist voices cam-
paigned for all violence against women to be taken seriously and coincided
with those demanding ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ pol-
icy responses to crime. Such an ‘unholy’ alignment was more discernible
in the United States than perhaps elsewhere (Goodmark 2018) but it is,
nevertheless, the case that as recognition of, and concern about, violence
against women made its presence felt in England and Wales from the late
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1970s onwards, the policies developed in response to such concerns were
marked by a recourse to the law (see, inter alia, Smart 1989; Snider 2008;
Walklate 2008). The purpose of this article is to expose the ongoing pres-
ence of this thesis by subjecting it to a deeper historical analysis through
the examination of historical case studies from which contemporary policy
preoccupations may have something to learn.
It is important to note that the first ‘modern’ criminal law intervention
into domestic violence came in the form of the Domestic Violence andMat-
rimonial Proceedings Act 1976. Prior to this sea change in governmen-
tal approach to domestic violence, researchers must go back more than
120 years, to the ‘Criminal Procedure Act’ 1853 (otherwise known as
the ‘Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Aggravated Assaults upon
Women and Children’) to find an intervention in criminal law aimed specif-
ically at addressing domestic violence. In the intervening years, other ap-
proaches to addressing the problem of violence against women were given
greater prominence and the purpose of this article is to explore these his-
torical (dis)continuities. In order to do so the article falls into four parts.
The first part offers an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the
criminalisation thesis. The second part moves back in time to examine what
was already known about the capacity of the criminal justice process to re-
spond to violence against women. Next, the article considers what might
be learned in the present from the past. The concluding and final part of
this article considers how best to move forward in the light of these consid-
erations. However, first of all it is of value to offer a note of caution.
Not all voices concerned about violence against women sang from the
same (criminalisation) hymn sheet. Notable, for example, was Elizabeth
Wilson’s short book published in 1983 entitled What is to be Done about Vi-
olence Against Women in which she laid out a multi-faceted policy response
invoking the need for changes in social policy and ideological beliefs about
women in which changing the law was only one ingredient. Wilson (1983,
p.228) argued that changes in the law were needed where the law sup-
ported violence against women and in this regard the law has changed in
many different respects and in many different jurisdictions. This has been
the case particularly in relation to rape and/or sexual assault exemplified
in the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 and the inclusion
of coercive control embraced in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015.
Yet despite the plethora of activity underpinning these changes, Mooney
(2007) was able to ask: how is it that violence against women could be a
public anathema and a private commonplace all at the same time? (see also
Schneider 2000; Stanko 2007).
Yet the recourse to law continues to fuel policy and political imagina-
tions. This is in the face of the evidenced practical and conceptual conse-
quences of pursuing this approach, demonstrated consistently and persis-
tently by feminist and legal scholars such as Smart (1989), Naffine (1990),
and Hudson (2003, 2006), among many others. Each of these commen-
tators, in different ways, points to the barriers in the recourse to law for
women inherent in how the legal subject is constituted. This legal subject
constituted by the rational man of law means that simply adding women
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and stirring is fraught with difficulties. This man of law dominates who
and what is considered rational, actionable, and what is doable within any
criminal justice system. Indeed, Greene and O’Leary (2018) observe: ‘laws
can bolster and maintain patriarchy’ (p.78), despite their intention to do
otherwise, and they do so as a form of ‘soft misogyny’ (Dunlap 2016). In
offering a deep and provocative analysis of this recourse to law (the crim-
inalisation thesis) Goodmark (2018) outlines the policy challenges which
can ensue from it. The first part of this article considers this thesis as it is
articulated in present policy responses to domestic violence.
The Criminalisation Thesis: Strengths and Weaknesses
Goodmark’s (2018) analysis points to the different ways in which criminal
justice responses have reaped benefits for women living in violent rela-
tionships. For example, mandatory arrest policies offer some respite from
abuse for some women for a short time; various orders mandating the of-
fender to stay away from the victim can have a similar effect; the introduc-
tion of court mandated interventions for violent men have demonstrated
some success by making offenders accountable for their behaviour; simi-
larly the threat and/or experience of prison can offer some women some
respite; and, finally, criminal justice responses can also satisfy desires to
punish. On the other hand those same responses have impacted on women
in different ways, for example, in resulting in greater State control over
their children (particularly for ethnic minority women, those belonging to
Indigenous populations and women with disabilities); in adding to the in-
creasing dual arrest phenomenon for incidents of domestic violence (where
the police officer arrests both the ‘perpetrator’ and the ‘victim’ in the ab-
sence of evidence differentiating one from the other; see Miller and Meloy
(2006)); in having a differential impact on women of colour (Goodmark’s
(2018) term); in adding to hyperincarceration and tying up police and
criminal justice resources to no good effect (especially if that good effect
is intended as the ending of such violence). Goodmark (2018) is clearly
commenting on the impact that the criminalisation thesis has had in the
United States and she goes on to make the case for a more holistic response
reminiscent of Wilson’s (1983) agenda. Yet despite the United States’ ori-
entation of this analysis, some of the issues and contradictions she raises
are self-evidently also pertinent in the ongoing recourse to the law found
in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.
This recourse to the law is exemplified in the draft Domestic Violence
and Abuse Bill 2019. This proposed legislation is presented as the culmina-
tion of over a decade of activity which has focused attention on the role of
the criminal justice process in relation to domestic abuse and the capacity
of that process to offer a better ‘service’ to women. In the space afforded
to this article it is not possible to offer a detailed analysis of the range of
activity this has entailed. However, in offering a few highlights of the suc-
cess and/or failure of this activity it is worth reiterating the findings, for
example, ofHM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2014) andHMInspectorate
of Constabulary (2015). Both reports point to the ongoing gaps in policing
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responses to domestic violence alongside evidence indicating the patchy
implementation of the offence of coercive control introduced in the Seri-
ous Crimes Act 2015 (see, for example, Barlow et al. 2020; Bishop 2016). Of
course, difficulties in implementing legislation do not pertain only to the
police but also take their toll as cases progress (or not) through the crimi-
nal justice process. The well-documented problem of attrition is illustrative
in this respect (see, inter alia, Walby, Armstrong and Strid 2012). Yet the
proposed legislation is clearly deeply embedded in perpetuating some of
these issues.
This Bill, published in January 2019, is wide ranging and ambitious.
Indeed, in many ways it exemplifies the kind of holistic and integrated re-
sponse proposed byWilson in 1983. It includes recommendations address-
ing education for healthy relationships in schools, for improving training
for the police, social workers, health care professionals etc., court dispo-
sitions for offenders, services and support for victims, health, and so on.
In fact, in Annex 3 the document lists 123 commitments indicating the
departments responsible for realising them. It also includes some state-
ments concerning the funding for these commitments which, when read in
isolation, appear impressive. However, the impressive rhetoric contained
in this Bill needs to be separated from its key focus. For example, much
is made in the proposed legislation of its expansive definition of domes-
tic abuse (which is to be commended) while at the same time retaining its
gender-neutral embrace contradicting the widely-available evidence about
such abuse. In addition, much is made of rendering breaches of various
domestic violence orders criminal offences, placing the domestic violence
disclosure scheme on a statutory basis, guidance on disclosure of informa-
tion and, interestingly, the creation of the new role of a domestic abuse
commissioner (already appointed). Thus the actual proposed legislation
retains a focus on criminalisation despite all the evidenced difficulties with
this. The reasons for this continued embrace are not of concern here but
the ongoing preoccupation with criminalisation is. So what might an ap-
preciation of the past reveal about this preoccupation?
Looking to the Past
Two centuries prior to the draft Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill 2019,
victims of domestic violence suffered in silence; not only a cultural silence,
part of a society blind to, or unwilling to acknowledge, their plight, but also
a legal silence. Domestic abuse was ever present, then as now, behind closed
doors and in the shadows of semi-public spaces. However, those subject to
domestic violence, primarily women, had no specific rights or recourses
in law to address the wrongs done to them. The little-substantiated but
commonly-held ‘rule of thumb’ (Simpson: 1984) – that a man had a right
to physically discipline his wife and children if they displeased him – had
spread its cultural roots to the 19th Century from the distance of the 18th
Century and earlier. In law, and in practice, those who were victims of
murder, manslaughter, of life-endangering assaults at the hands of spouses,
partners, and parents might find protection under the regular statutes of
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criminal law, but those who suffered recurrent beating and humiliation,
coercion, wounding, and sexual violence in a domestic setting had little or
no right to bring a complaint to court.
The coincidental arrival of a new Queen in 1837, and a slow shift away
from the distant past towards a world more familiar to our own, brought
with it change in both perceptions of crime, and belief in English moral
exceptionalism. Both played a significant role in the rights and experi-
ences of vulnerable women in the next 150 years. As Wiener (2004) notes:
‘during the sixty-four year reign of a woman, the treatment of women in
Britain and in the burgeoning empire became a touchstone of civilisation
and national pride’ (p.10). This claim, though problematic, captures the
unique and concerted effort of social campaigners and government poli-
cymakers in the second half of the 19th Century to advance the rights of
women with a view to reducing their vulnerability to exploitation and vi-
olence. Although the Victorian ideal of domesticity did much to facilitate
and excuse male violence in the home and women’s subordination to it,
social responses to marital violence were often more progressive in this pe-
riod than wemight expect (Clark 2000). No other era in history, accept our
own 20th and 21st Centuries, made such an impact in tackling the causes
of recurrent domestic violence. What is most remarkable about this period
of progress is that, despite the Victorian’s love of criminalisation and incar-
ceration, the greatest legal protections against domestic violence received
by women were not through criminal law interventions, but through ad-
vances in family and property law.
The 19th Century saw only one stand-alone change to criminal law
which dealt specifically with domestic violence. The Criminal Procedure
Act 1853 was the first legislative attempt made to limit the level of ‘chas-
tisement’ a man was entitled to give to his wife or children. The Act made
assaults on women, and boys under the age of 14 years, punishable by a
magistrate with a fine and up to six months in prison. The Act represents a
legal landmark, through which authorities indicated that not all domestic
violence was acceptable (Clark 2000; Weiner 2004). However, while the Act
gave greater access to justice for victims of domestic violence from a legal
perspective, the increasing culture of social subordination and economic
dependency into which women were forced, limited their willingness to
prosecute in this way. As Susan Kingsley Kent (1999) described, even con-
temporary campaigners for women’s rights recognised that the wider land-
scape of women’s legal inequality ‘exposed them to the brutalities of the
world at large’ (p.191). A husband serving six months in prison for assault
meant six months of financial crisis for many working-class families. Not to
mention social stigma and ostracism, particularly for those in the middle
class, and the prospect of more violence as a reprisal when husband and
wife were reunited. Concerns are still present in modern debates on leg-
islating for domestic violence in the current day (see, inter alia, Douglas
2012; Goodmark 2018).
Another consequence of the Act was that it removed control of prosecu-
tion from the hands of the victim. As a result, victims of domestic violence
who had very real fears about the consequences of prosecution could be
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forced to give testimony against their will. At SouthwarkMagistrates Court,
in July 1857, a ‘dissipated-lookingman’, John Smith, was bought before the
magistrate charged with an assault on his wife, Ellen. After a day of drink-
ing, John had returned home to the house he shared with Ellen in Suffolk
Street, and begun ‘abusing’ her. Ellen had tried to escape the abuse, but
was caught by John, struck and knocked down, sustaining bloody injuries
to her face. The commotion drew the attention of a local constable who
took John into custody to await trial under the 1853 Act. Ellen, however,
was at pains to point out that she had no wish to pursue a prosecution,
and that she ‘hoped his worship would not punish him [John]’ (Morning
Chronicle, 10 July 1857). In an open court room, Ellen was probed about
John’s history of domestic violence. He had a former conviction for a simi-
lar assault, also under the Act, which earned him three months in custody.
Ellen, hesitating, admitted John’s previous abuse, but was quick to assume
responsibility, claiming that the abuse had been ‘her fault then’ and that she
was sorry for the prosecution. Despite the fact that Ellen ‘begged his wor-
ship not to send her husband to prison again’, whether fearful of reprisals
from a violent husband or the economic consequences of losing the family
breadwinner, John was committed to hard labour for six months. Cases like
that of John and Ellen Smith illustrate that seeking to better criminalise do-
mestic violence could, and still may, unintentionally drive violence further
underground, silencing victims who are in need of assistance but fear the
ordeal and results of such prosecutions.
There weremany other victims, willingly prosecuting under the Act, but
who also gave clear evidence suggesting that criminalisation and incarcer-
ation of violent partners was not their primary interest. Just months before
Ellen Smith reluctantly testified in Southwark, Mrs Elijah Lewis took her
husband of a few months to court at the Guildhall. Her aim, she told the
magistrate was ‘not to send her husband to prison, but to be protected from
his violence; in fact, to be separated from him’ (Hereford Times, 21 February
1857). Likewise, ElizabethWilkinson took her husband, Frederick, to court
after some years of marriage due to his ‘constant habit of getting drunk and
ill-using her’. On one occasion, in June of 1864, Frederick came home from
drinking and assaulted Elizabeth, attempted to strangle her, and told her
that he intended to kill her. Frederick was only prevented from doing so by
the intervention of lodgers. Elizabeth, just like Ellen Smith and Mrs Lewis,
tried to dissuade the magistrate from imposing a custodial sentence, ask-
ing, instead, that the magistrate bind her husband over to keep the peace,
and to separate from her, for she could make her own livelihood, she testi-
fied, if she were not tied to a man who took her money for his own support
(Standard, 8 June 1864).
The Criminal Procedure Act 1853 would be amended in later years,
but it remained the only substantial piece of legislation aimed at tackling
domestic violence through criminal prosecution for more than a century.
This may have been, in part, due to continued reluctance of the Victorian
State to intervene in marital disputes but was also, arguably, in recognition
of the limitations of criminalisation as effective deterrent to domestic vio-
lence. Just three years after the Act became law, the Assaults on Women and
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Children: Return of the Convictions and Sentences within the Police Districts of the
Metropolis (House of Commons 1856) indicated that convictions for assaults
on women and children across London’s major police courts numbered in
only the low hundreds (see alsoReports to the Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment on the State of the Law Relating to Brutal Assaults (House of Commons
1875). Yet, in the 20 years preceding the 1853 Act, and the decades that
followed, a separate legislative agenda limiting the susceptibility of mar-
ried women to abuse took shape; the aim was to protect women at risk of
violence and coercion through changes to child custody, access to divorce,
and property rights. One of the most significant pieces of civil legislation
addressing women’s rights in this way was passed in 1839, following the
highly-publicised marital discord of the aristocratic Norton family.
Caroline Sheridan, a gentleman’s daughter and author, married George
Norton, an aristocrat and unsuccessful barrister and politician, in 1827.
In the decade that followed, their tumultuous marriage became a lasting
illustration of the corrupt power dynamics that trapped women in physi-
cal, economic, and emotional subservience to bad husbands. Caroline was
the victim of regular physical abuse at her husband’s hands, unable to ob-
tain financial freedom from him, or successfully petition for a divorce. In
the eight years in which they lived together, Caroline would suffer regu-
lar physical and emotional violence at the hands of her husband. George
has been noted as throwing books and an inkstand at his wife, setting her
writing materials alight, breaking down the locked door to her study and
forcefully removing her from the room, burning Caroline with a tea ket-
tle, as well as being responsible for regular quarrels which erupted into
physical violence, that may on one occasion have resulted in Caroline’s loss
of a pregnancy (Craig 2009, pp.109–10). Caroline left the family home in
1835, but returned soon after, unable to support herself (with no rights to
her own earnings or property), and missing her children. In the eyes of
the law, Caroline returning effectively condoned her husband’s behaviour
(a very familiar and contemporary response of ‘victim’ blaming), nullifying
her petition to divorce him on the grounds of ‘cruelty’ (domestic abuse).
Justmonths later, George removed himself from the family home, in prepa-
ration for a lawsuit in which he attempted to sue the then Prime Minister,
Lord Melbourne, for ‘criminal conversation’ (adultery) with Caroline. An
ultimately unsuccessful move intended to humiliate his wife, isolate her
from her closest friend, and damage her reputation. When the lawsuit
proved unsuccessful, George’s final act of punishment, coercion, and con-
trol against Caroline was to remove their children from the family home,
lodging them in Scotland, and permitting Caroline neither visitation nor
knowledge of their whereabouts. The situation continued for more than
five years, until her youngest son died in an accident, after which she was
permitted supervised visitation by him, at his family home. This proved to
be a turning point.
The Infant Custody Act was passed in 1839, in no small part due to the
tireless campaigning of Caroline Norton (McGough: 2005). The Act gave
‘virtuous’ (not adulterous, drunken, or otherwise ‘unsuitable’) wives, the
right to apply for custody of their children under the age of seven years,
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and access rights to those over the age of seven years in the custody of
their father (Custody of Infants Act 1839, 2&3 Vict., c. 54 (Eng)). The Act
did nothing to address domestic violence, but for the first time under law,
women like Caroline, wanting to remove themselves from abusive domes-
tic situations, were not faced with the impossible decision of leaving their
young children behind with the perpetrator, and having no future rights
to access. In practice, the courts remained reluctant to involve themselves
in matters of marital dispute, and with no provision for maintenance, pe-
titioning and gaining custody of children was rendered impractical for all
but the independently wealthy. As McGough (2005) notes: ‘the possession
of rights is a meaningless abstraction without some means to ensure that
one’s voice is heard’ (p.17). In some ways, the conditions of the Act were an
early example of Greene andO’Leary’s (2018, p.78) concerns over the abil-
ity of law to maintain patriarchy even as it offers positive change. However,
the Infant Custody Act 1839 remains a critical development in addressing
the causes and impact of recurrent domestic violence, in which children
could be used to control and coerce victims, and prevent them leaving vi-
olent domestic settings. Most importantly, infant custody was the first of
several pieces of key legislation supporting women in removing themselves
from abusive domestic situations.
Less than 20 years after women gained the right to custody of their
young children, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 widened access to di-
vorce throughout the United Kingdom. Prior to this Act, only those with
the status and funds to privately petition parliament could dissolve an un-
happy marriage. The Act preserved some marital inequality between men
and women. While men could sue for divorce on the grounds of adultery
alone, women had to prove a second charge such as bigamy, desertion, or
cruelty. However, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 did allow, for the first
time, women to divorce their husbands on the grounds of cruelty alone.
Divorce may have remained difficult to procure and highly stigmatised for
the rest of the century, yet the Act provided a vital lifeline to woman des-
perate to escape violent marriages. Furthermore, it recognised in law that
abuse of wives by their husbands was not to go unquestioned, by either the
State or, most importantly, spouses themselves. A further amendment to
the Act in 1878 allowed women to secure separation from their husbands
on the grounds of cruelty, gain further rights to custody of their children,
and enabled magistrates to issue protection orders to women whose hus-
bands had been convicted of aggravated assault. The year 1878 represents,
perhaps, the most significant contribution to ending abusive marriages,
with women finally able to pursue separation from violent husbands as a
matter of course (D’Cruze 1998).
Further family and property law legislation followed. From 1870
through to 1882, a succession of acts concerning married women’s prop-
erty were passed. Ultimately these acts recognised the separate legal
status of women, their rights to maintain their own property brought into
a marriage, and rights to their own earnings. The acts did not end the
economic dependence of women on men; they did, however, provide pro-
tection to women who separated from their husbands. Until the Married
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Women’s Property Act(s) of 1870 and 1882, abusive husbands could claim
the property and earnings of wives who tried to live independently from
them. Family and civil law interventions such as these, seeking to miti-
gate the vulnerability and exploitation of women, continued into the 20th
Century. In regards to unhappy marriages, the 1923 amendment to the
Matrimonial Causes Act gavemen andwomen the right to apply for divorce
on equal terms, and the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Mainte-
nance) Act 1925 made it easier for either partner in a marriage to apply
for separation and financial support. Post-war welfare legislation, too, such
as the Family Allowances Act 1945, played a role in tackling the financial
and social vulnerability that contributed (and still contributes) to trapping
women in violent domestic situations.
Accurately charting historic rates of domestic violence are challenging.
Not only due to the dark figure of unreported crimes, but because prior
to the late 20th Century no separate category for domestic assaults was
recorded among general arrests and prosecutions for interpersonal vio-
lence (D’Cruze and Jackson 2009, pp.21–9). However, the history of the
acts explored briefly above suggest that history does have pertinent lessons
to teach us about future domestic violence policy. The positive impact that
advancing women’s economic and social rights in the 19th and early 20th
Centuries had on reducing vulnerability to repeat domestic violence is a
practical historical example of Wilson’s (1983) assertion that social and
cultural change has as big a role to play in ending domestic violence as
criminal prosecution. Historians of crime have also highlighted this, when
charting the declining acceptance of domestic violence (if not its criminal-
isation) over the course of the 19th Century (Emsley 2005, pp.103–6). Of
course, we cannot be certain that changes to civil legislation alone reduced
actual rates of domestic violence. Historians have indicated time and again
that declines in prosecutions for particular offences cannot be used to ev-
idence declines in criminal practice, only prosecution patterns (Gatrell,
Lenman and Parker 1980; Godfrey 2014, 2015; Godfrey, Farrall andKarst-
edt 2005). However, what is clear, is that in themore than 100 years preced-
ing the Domestic Violence Act 1976, it was family and property law which
provided the widest range of opportunities for protecting and removing
women from violent domestic situations, rather than legislation focused on
the criminalisation and short-term incarceration of their abusers. This evi-
dence and the evidenced shortcomings associated with reliance on criminal
justice responses alone lends considerable support to Nussbaum (2011) ca-
pabilities approach as a guide to intervention.
Concluding Thoughts: ‘Lessons from History’?
There are a number of points of connection between the present and
the past in the material discussed above. One connecting theme is the
continuing, and evidenced reluctance of women to engage in criminal
justice as a response to the violence(s) of their partners. The consequences
of doing so remain unremittingly the same: loss of income, status, shame,
and so on. Here Lawrence’s (2019) observations on the importance of
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continuity are clearly exampled. The legislative landscape may have been
different but its inhabitants were remarkably similar to us. The past, after
all, was still populated by people who loved their children, worried about
money, felt anxious about what their neighbours might think, and took se-
riously the prospect of upending their family lives. However, as Lawrence
(2019) also points out, continuity is not only long, it can also be deep.
The material discussed here points to the wider civil changes in women’s
rights over access to divorces, custody over children and property being
used more frequently than criminalisation, in attempts to improve the
position of those women living with violence, at least those who were in
a position to avail themselves of the opportunities that these civil changes
afforded. What is more, it was these changes that women living with
domestic violence themselves asked for time and again, in court, in public
writings, and as they reached out to campaigners and lawmakers. Here,
too, the continuities are also, arguably, profound since those unable to
avail themselves effectively and affordably of such civil changes remains
very much the same. The answer to the perennial question of: why does
she stay (or as in the case cited above: why did she go back) is still locked
in economics, availability of accommodation, access to children, and, as
ever, love (Kuennen 2014). None of these issues are effectively addressed
in the criminalisation thesis nor are they taken seriously (that is in terms
which make sense to women themselves) in the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019.
So these are the simple and obvious points of connection between the past
and the present from which those occupied by presentism might learn.
However, perhaps there is also something deeper to excavate here.
Yeomans (2019) offers a number of the functions of history for contem-
porary criminology and criminal justice policy. These he itemises as: un-
derstanding what came before (as in offering a prologue); understanding
the origins of the present; appreciating the particular characteristics of the
present; illuminating how things have unfolded over time (the processes);
and pointing to the relativity of the present in so far as history can reveal
that the present was not inevitable. None of these functions exist in isola-
tion though some might be more prescient than others, depending upon
the issue under consideration. In reflecting on the points of connection
between the present and the past offered in the discussion above, it is pos-
sible to discern that the present preoccupation with criminalisation was not
inevitable. Other choices could have been made and were, indeed, made
in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The unfolding processes written be-
tween the lines of this discussion lie in the increased civil rights of women
which, arguably, lay the groundwork for the influence of second wave fem-
inism in the mid-20th Century. It was, perhaps, at this juncture that the
presentism of the criminalisation thesis can be found. This has, arguably,
done little to benefit women in the long term (see, inter alia, Snider 2008)
and might be understood as a feature of what Fraser (2009) has called the
‘cunning of history’.
Fraser (2009) observes that second wave feminism coincided with the
emergence of neoliberalism and thrived under these conditions valuing
personal responsibility. Within these deeper processes feminist challenges
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of (mis)recognition and (mis)representation became relabelled as claims
for justice centred on difference and identity. In her view, this unhappy
liaison (between feminism and neoliberalism) provided the space in which
feminist claims about women’s experiences of violence(s) became aligned
with what Garland (2001) has called a culture of control. This is the cun-
ning of history. Better connecting the past and the present affords a better
base from which to make sense of the present. This can be done, and Yeo-
mans (2019) offers one way of moving forward on this. Lawrence (2019)
offers a slightly different one. It is without doubt, however, that an appre-
ciation of history that is both long and deep would do much to challenge
contemporary policy debates in responding to violence(s) against women.
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